tages of this account of indicative conditionals, and in section. 5 I reply to on Grice’s Views about the Logical Particles of Natural Language,” in Prag- matics of . if it is a valid inference, then the indicative conditional conclusion must be logically 3 H.P. Grice, in his William James lectures, 4 pursued the first of these . conditionals, but not those of indicative conditionals, are known to be false or at . of this view include Lewis , Jackson , , and Grice [a]. 6.
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They also point out grife some constructions are rarer, and harder to understand, and more peculiar, than would be expected if conditionals had truth conditions and embedded in a standard way. You have eliminated the possibility that both A and B are false.
That is all there is to the claim that degrees of belief should have the structure of probabilities.
So by Import-Export, 1 is a logical truth. Call this the certainty-preservation principle CPP.
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Philosophical Papers Volume 2Oxford: Any necessarily truth-preserving argument satisfies PPP. And a nice logic emerges, which is now well known. The nurse who kills the patient still carried out an order.
Rani Lill Anjum, Paul Grice on Indicative Conditionals – PhilPapers
Civil War American History: The if in always if …, sometimes if …, and the rest is on a par with the non-connective and in between cknditionals and …with the non-connective or in whether … or … condirionals, or with the non-connective if in the probability that … if. Hook saves modus ponens by claiming that I must accept 4. The nurse puts a pillow over the patient’s face and kills her. We had an example above.
Page references indixative You are not being asked how many children you have in the nearest possible world in which you have children. The difference is this: This argument form is invalid Supp and Stalnaker agree. He seems to advocate an error theory of conditionals: The notion of conditional probability entered probability theory at an early stage because it was needed to compute the probability of a conjunction.
And for argument involving only factual propositions, the converse is also true: If the antecedent is false, the question lapses: So treating the premises would be to require of indicatve valid argument that it preserve certainty: It is very close to certain that if you toss the coin ten times, you will get at least one head; but it is certainly false indixative the consequent is true at all nearest antecedent-worlds.
But he still takes his original theory to be a serious candidate Stalnakerand this remains a popular theory. A is called the antecedent, C the consequent. The following assumption is very plausible: By our assumption b is certainly false. Indicatuve, no theory has an intuitively adequate account of compounds of conditionals: But if we use conditionals when arguing about contingent matters, then great caution will be required.
So 2 is a logical truth.
Grice The Material Conditional: One can try other truth tables: That’s enough to know that if x is red, y is not red.